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Prologue	
AT	MIDNIGHT	on	30	June	1997,	the	Hong	Kong	Convention	Centre	was	flooded	with	political	
dignitaries,	with	the	Prince	of	Wales	leading	the	British	delegation	and	President	Jiang	Zemin	
leading	the	Chinese	delegation,	all	waiting	eagerly	but	in	entirely	different	moods	to	witness	the	
handover	ceremony	of	Hong	Kong	to	China.		As	the	Union	Jack	was	lowered	for	the	last	time	in	
Hong	Kong,	the	150	years	of	British	reign	over	her	last	colony	came	to	an	end.		The	fading	tune	
of	God	Save	the	Queen	was	soon	followed	by	the	marching	trumpets	of	the	PRC	national	anthem,	
and	immediately	the	PRC	flag	was	steadily	and	confidently	hoisted,	accompanied	by	the	visibly	
smaller	SAR	flag	which	was	raised	at	half	a	pace	slower,	thus	marking	the	dawn	of	a	new	era	for	
Hong	Kong.		The	Hong	Kong	Special	Administrative	Region	was	born,	with	the	relative	position	of	
the	PRC	flag	and	the	SAR	flag	vividly	and	powerfully	conveying	the	message	that	‘one	country’	
comes	before	‘two	systems’	in	the	innovative	constitutional	arrangement	of	‘one	country,	two	
systems’.	
I.	 A	High	Degree	of	Autonomy:	The	Arrangement	of	‘One	Country,	Two	Systems’	
1.1	 The	arrangement	
Pursuant	to	the	Sino-British	Joint	Declaration	1984,	Hong	Kong	became	a	Special	
Administrative	Region	(‘HKSAR’)	of	the	PRC	on	1	July	1997.1		It	enjoys	a	high	degree	of	autonomy	
except	in	foreign	affairs	and	defence,	and	in	areas	which	are	the	responsibilities	of	the	Central	
People’s	Government.2		It	is	vested	with	executive,	legislative	and	independent	judicial	powers,	
including	the	power	of	final	adjudication.3		The	law	in	force	before	the	changeover	remains	
basically	unchanged.4			National	laws	shall	not	apply	to	the	HKSAR	except	those	relating	to	
foreign	affairs	and	defence	and	they	will	only	apply	pursuant	to	a	prescribed	procedure.5		A	
																																								 																				
1	 For	a	detail	description	of	the	process	of	the	transfer	of	sovereignty	over	Hong	Kong,	see	J	Chan,	
‘From	Colony	to	SAR’,	in	Johannes	Chan	and	CL	Lim	(eds),	Law	of	the	Constitution	of	Hong	Kong	(Sweet	&	
Maxwell,	2011),	Ch	1.	
2	The	Basic	Law	of	Hong	Kong	(‘BLHK’),	articles	(“arts”)	13	&	14.	
3	BLHK,	art	2.	
4	BLHK,	art	8.		
5	BLHK,	art	18.	
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Court	of	Final	Appeal	has	been	established	to	replace	the	Privy	Council,	which	was	the	highest	
court	of	appeal	of	the	former	colony.6		Fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	are	protected.7		The	
prevailing	social	and	economic	systems	remain	unchanged.		Socialist	policies	on	the	Mainland	
shall	not	apply	to	the	HKSAR.8			It	retains	the	status	of	a	free	port	and	a	separate	customs	
territory.9		It	has	its	own	independent	finances	and	is	allowed	to	continue	to	use	its	currency.10		
It	also	enjoys	varying	degree	of	freedoms	in	concluding	external	relations,	albeit	in	the	name	of	
‘Hong	Kong,	China’.11			These	policies,	which	shall	remain	unchanged	for	50	years,	are	stipulated	
and	elaborated	in	the	Basic	Law,	the	constitution	of	the	HKSAR.12		The	Basic	Law	was	
promulgated	by	the	National	People’s	Congress	in	April	1990,	and	came	into	force	on	1	July	
1997.	
1.2	 Inherent	Contradictions	
While	it	is	not	uncommon	to	have	more	than	one	legal	system	within	a	single	sovereign	
country,13	the	co-existence	of	two	systems	that	are	vastly	different	in	ideology	and	values	will	
give	rise	to	inevitable	conflicts.		On	one	side	of	the	border	there	is	a	well-established	common	
law	system	that	rests	upon	individualism	and	the	doctrine	of	separation	of	powers.		On	the	
other	side	of	the	border	there	is	an	emerging	legal	system	that	is	partly	based	on	socialist	
ideology,	partly	based	on	the	civil	law	system	and	increasingly	influenced	by	the	common	law	
system.		It	subscribes	to	the	supremacy	of	the	soviet	and	people	democratic	dictatorship,	and	
operates	largely	on	a	central	planning	system.		Thus,	when	the	two	systems	meet,	there	are	
bound	to	be	conflicts	arising	from	a	difference	in	culture,	values,	and	systems.,	which	difference	
is	further	complicated	by	an	absence	of	clear	demarcation	of	jurisdictions	and	the	absence	of	
any	conflict	resolution	mechanism	between	the	two	systems.			
II.	 Central-local	Relationship	
2.1 Competing	for	greater	autonomy	
	
The	conflict	between	the	two	systems	is	best	exemplified	by	the	conflict	over	the	
interpretation	of	the	Basic	Law,	which	is	simultaneously	the	constitution	of	the	HKSAR	and	a	
piece	of	national	law	promulgated	by	the	National	People’s	Congress	Standing	Committee	
(‘NPCSC’).			Under	Article	158	of	the	Basic	Law,	the	power	of	interpretation	of	the	Basic	Law	is	
																																								 																				
6	BLHK,	art	82.	
7	BLHK,	chapter	III.		
8	BLHK,	preamble.	
9	BLHK,	arts	114	&	116.	
10	BLHK,	arts	106	&	111.	
11	BLHK,	art	116.	
12	BLHK,	art	5.	
13	Federal	system	is	a	prime	example.		For	a	good	discussion	of	different	models	of	autonomous	system,	
see		Marc	Weller	and	Katherine	Nobbs	(eds),	Asymmetrical	Autonomy	and	the	Settlement	of	Ethnic	
Conflicts	(University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2010).	
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vested	in	the	NPCSC.		Hong	Kong	courts	can	interpret	any	provision	of	the	Basic	Law	as	well.		
However,	if	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	finds	it	necessary	to	interpret	any	provision	of	the	Basic	
Law	which	is	an	excluded	provision,	it	shall	refer	the	interpretation	to	the	NPCSC	before	
rendering	its	final	judgment,	and	the	interpretation	of	the	NPCSC	shall	be	binding	on	Hong	Kong,	
except	that	previous	judgments	rendered	shall	not	be	affected.		An	excluded	provision	refers	to	
those	provisions	concerning	affairs	which	are	the	responsibility	of	the	Central	People’s	
Government	or	the	relationship	between	the	Central	Authorities	and	the	HKSAR.		In	Ng	Ka	Ling	v	
Director	of	Immigration,14	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	held	that	it	is	under	a	duty	to	refer	a	
provision	to	the	NPCSC	for	interpretation	if	(1)	the	provision	concerned	is	an	excluded	provision	
(‘classification	test’);	and	(2)	it	is	necessary	to	interpret	the	excluded	provision	as	its	
interpretation	will	affect	the	judgment	in	the	case	(‘necessity	test’).			In	applying	the	
classification	test,	if	the	scope	of	an	excluded	provision	is	qualified	or	affected	by	a	non-
excluded	provision,	the	court	will	adopt	a	predominant	test,	namely,	as	a	matter	of	substance	
which	is	the	predominant	provision	that	has	to	be	interpreted	in	the	adjudication	of	the	case.	In	
Lau	Kong	Yung	v	Director	of	Immigration,15	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	observed	that	it	would	
have	to	re-visit	these	tests	in	light	of	the	interpretation	of	the	NPCSC	reversing	the	decision	of	
the	Court	in	Ng	Ka	Ling.		However,	so	far	the	court	has	not	found	an	appropriate	opportunity	to	
review	these	tests.		Instead,	it	continues	to	apply	the	classification	test	and	the	necessity	test.16	
	
The	National	People’s	Congress	(‘NPC’)	is	the	legislative	assembly	of	the	PRC.		It	
comprises	about	3,000	members	and	meets	only	once	a	year.		In	view	of	its	size	and	the	
infrequency	of	its	meeting,	the	NPC	is	largely	a	dignified	ceremonial	institution	that	mainly	
rubber-stamps	decisions	made	elsewhere.			When	it	is	not	in	session,	its	power	is	vested	in	the	
NPCSC,	which	comprises	about	180	members.			In	contrast	to	the	Legislature	in	the	common	law	
system,	the	NPC	can	exercise	legislative,	executive	and	judicial	functions.			Its	power	to	interpret	
law	is	based	on	both	ideological	premises	and	practical	necessity.		Ideologically,	the	power	to	
make	law	is	vested	in	the	Supreme	Soviet	(the	NPC),	which	represents	the	people,	and	the	
power	to	interpret	law	is	a	corollary	power	that	flows	from	the	power	to	make	law.		Practically,	
there	is	a	need	to	maintain	consistency.		China	has	experienced	the	dark	period	of	lawlessness	
during	the	Cultural	Revolution.		When	it	emerged	from	the	Cultural	Revolution	in	1978	and	
began	to	rebuild	the	national	legal	system,	a	major	challenge	was	to	ensure	consistency	of	
interpretation	of	the	law	promulgated	by	the	Central	Government,	given	the	vast	geographical	
size	of	China	and	the	varying	quality	of	judicial	and	government	personnel	in	different	parts	of	
the	country.		The	power	of	the	NPCSC	to	interpret	law	is	a	solution	to	address	this	problem.		It	is	
an	efficient	means	to	further	clarify	the	scope	of	the	law	or	to	make	supplemental	provisions	to	
																																								 																				
14	(1999)	2	HKCFAR	4.	
15	(1999)	2	HKCFAR	300.	
16	Democratic	Republic	of	the	Congo	v	FG	Hemisphere	Associates	LLC,	[2011]	4	HKC	151,	paras	403-405	
(‘the	Congo	case’).		
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enable	the	smooth	implementation	of	the	law.17		In	this	regard,	the	distinction	between	
interpretation	and	amendment	is	very	fine.18	
	
Under	Article	67	of	the	PRC	Constitution	and	Article	158	of	the	Basic	Law,	the	NPCSC	has	
the	power	to	interpret	the	provisions	of	the	Basic	Law.		Under	the	common	law	system,	the	
interpretation	of	law	is	the	sole	province	of	the	judiciary,	which	alone	can	pronounce	
authoritative	and	binding	interpretation	in	the	process	of	judicial	adjudication	after	a	rational	
process	of	hearing	and	weighing	carefully	arguments	from	both	sides.			Under	the	PRC	system,	
the	NPCSC,	which	is	a	political	organ,	has	the	power	to	issue	authoritative	and	binding	
interpretation	of	law	which	could	in	practice	amount	to	an	amendment	of	the	law	without	going	
through	the	formal	legislative	process	for	amending	law.		When	the	two	systems	must	interpret	
the	Basic	Law,	conflicts	regarding	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	and	the	integrity	of	the	
common	law	system	are	inevitable.		
	
2.2 Four	Interpretations	of	the	NPCSC	
2.2.1	 The	First	Interpretation	
The	first	occasion	for	interpretation	of	the	Basic	Law	arose	shortly	after	the	changeover	
in	Ng	Ka	Ling	v	Director	of	Immigration.19		Under	the	pre-1997	immigration	law,	children	born	to	
Hong	Kong	Permanent	Residents	(‘HKPR’)	outside	Hong	Kong	would	not	acquire	a	right	of	abode	
in	Hong	Kong.			Under	Article	24	of	the	Basic	Law,	these	children,	if	of	Chinese	nationality,	would	
fall	within	the	definition	of	HKPR	and	hence	enjoy	a	right	of	abode	in	Hong	Kong.		Many	of	these	
children	came	to	Hong	Kong	legally	as	tourists	and	over-stayed,	or	simply	came	to	Hong	Kong	
illegally	shortly	before	and	after	the	changeover.		They	surrendered	themselves	to	the	
immigration	authorities	after	the	changeover	and	demanded	for	an	identity	card	showing	their	
HKPR	status.		On	10	July	1997,	when	the	figure	of	these	children	hit	5,000,	the	Legislature	
passed	an	emergency	amendment	to	the	Immigration	Ordinance.		The	gist	of	the	amendment	
was	that	any	person	who	claimed	to	have	a	right	of	abode	in	Hong	Kong	must	produce	a	
certificate	of	entitlement,	which	could	only	be	applied	for	outside	Hong	Kong.		No	certificate	
would	be	issued	unless	the	applicants	(almost	exclusively	from	the	Mainland)	first	secured	an	
exit	approval	from	the	Security	Bureau	of	the	PRC.		The	constitutionality	of	this	new	
requirement	of	a	certificate	of	entitlement	was	challenged	for	being	contrary	to	Article	24	of	the	
Basic	Law.		In	response,	the	Director	argued	that	the	certificate	of	entitlement	system	was	
justified	by	Article	22	of	the	Basic	Law,	which	provided	that	people	from	other	parts	of	China	
must	apply	for	approval	for	entry	into	the	HKSAR	(‘the	immigration	issues’).			
																																								 																				
17	See	the	Opinion	of	Professor	Lian	Xisheng	dated	10	August	1999,	quoted	by	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	in	
Director	of	Immigration	v	Chong	Fong	Yuen	(2001)	4	HKCFAR	211	at	221.	
18	While	this	may	provide	a	justification	for	the	power	of	interpretation	by	the	NPCSC	in	the	early	days	of	
rebuilding	the	national	legal	system,	the	continued	existence	of	this	power	in	the	21st	century	has	indeed	
been	increasingly	queried	by	Mainland	scholars.	
19	(1999)	2	HKCFAR	4.		
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The	plaintiffs	also	mounted	a	more	fundamental	challenge.		As	a	result	of	a	breakdown	
in	negotiation	between	China	and	the	United	Kingdom	on	the	composition	of	the	last	Legislative	
Council	before	the	changeover,	the	Chinese	Government	declared	that	it	would	appoint	a	
Provisional	Legislative	Council	on	1	July	1997	which,	among	its	duties,	would	be	responsible	for	
forming	the	first	Legislative	Council	of	the	HKSAR.		The	amendments	to	the	Immigration	
Ordinance	in	1997	were	enacted	by	the	Provisional	Legislative	Council.		There	was	no	provision	
for	a	Provisional	Legislative	Council	in	the	Basic	Law.		Hence,	the	plaintiffs	argued	that	the	
Provisional	Legislative	Council	was	unconstitutional,	and	therefore	the	laws	that	it	purported	to	
make	were	of	no	legal	effect	unless	they	could	be	upheld	by	the	common	law	doctrine	of	
necessity	(‘the	constitutional	issues’).	
The	Court	held	that	the	certificate	of	entitlement	scheme	was	unconstitutional	as	it	has	
the	effect	of	vesting	in	the	Security	Bureau	of	the	PRC	the	power	to	determine	who	has	the	right	
of	abode	in	Hong	Kong.		It	also	refused	to	refer	a	question	of	interpretation	to	the	NPCSC	on	the	
ground	that	the	predominant	provision	to	be	determined	in	this	case	was	a	provision	within	the	
internal	autonomy	of	the	HKSAR.		The	Government	managed	to	secure	the	endorsement	of	the	
general	public	to	invite	the	NPCSC	to	render	an	interpretation,	which	was	given	in	June	1999	and	
which	had	the	effect	of	reversing	the	judgment	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal.	As	a	result	of	the	
NPCSC	Interpretation,	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	remarked	in	Lau	Kong	Yung	v	Director	of	
Immigration	that	it	would	have	to	review	the	classification	test,	the	necessity	test	and	the	
predominant	test.			Professor	Albert	Chen	of	The	University	of	Hong	Kong	argued	forcefully	that	
the	court	should	apply	the	necessity	test	before	the	classification	test	because	until	it	has	been	
identified	which	provision	needs	to	be	interpreted,	it	is	not	possible	to	apply	the	classification	
test.	20	Instead,	the	Court,	by	developing	the	predominant	test,	held	that	the	predominant	
provision	to	be	interpreted	was	Article	24,	which	was	not	an	excluded	provision,	and	therefore	it	
was	not	necessary	to	further	consider	the	necessity	test.		While	there	is	considerable	force	in	
Professor	Chen’s	argument,	the	predominant	provision	test	may	simply	be	understood	as	the	
Court	saying	that	it	is	unnecessary	to	interpret	the	non-predominant	provision.		Applying	the	
necessity	test	first	does	not	absolve	the	difficulty	of	applying	the	test.	The	problem	in	this	case	is	
that	two	provisions,	one	an	excluded	provision	and	one	a	non-excluded	provision,	are	involved.		
One	approach	is	that	whenever	an	excluded	provision	is	involved,	then	Article	158	is	engaged.		
The	obvious	danger	of	such	an	approach	is	that	the	excluded	provision	may	be	of	marginal	
relevance	only.		Thus	the	court	will	still	have	to	develop	a	requirement	of	a	real	need	to	
interpret	the	provision	in	applying	the	necessity	test.		The	other	approach	is	that	adopted	by	the	
Court,	namely,	to	determine	the	predominant	provision	to	be	interpreted.			
																																								 																				
20	Albert	Chen,	‘The	Court	of	Final	Appeal’s	Ruling	in	the	“Illegal	Migrant”	Children	Case:	A	Critical	
Commentary	on	the	Application	of	Article	158	of	the	Basic	Law’,	in	Johannes	Chan,	H	L	Fu	and	Yash	Ghai	
(eds),	Hong	Kong’s	Constitutional	Debate:	Conflict	over	Interpretation	(Hong	Kong	University	Press,	2000),	
113-141.	
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On	the	constitutional	issue,	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	held	that	as	a	piece	of	national	law,	
the	Basic	Law	bound	the	Central	Government	as	well.		The	Provisional	Legislative	Council	was	
appointed	pursuant	to	a	decision	of	the	NPCSC,	which	was	bound	by	the	Basic	Law.		Thus,	the	
Hong	Kong	Court	had	jurisdiction	to	consider	if	the	decision	of	the	NPCSC	was	consistent	with	
the	Basic	Law.			Given	the	limited	function	and	duration	of	the	Provisional	Legislative	Council,	
the	Court	further	held	that	it	fell	within	the	ambit	of	the	NPCSC’s	Decision	and	was	hence	
constitutional.			Nonetheless,	the	mere	possibility	of	the	Hong	Kong	Court	reviewing	the	
constitutionality	of	a	Decision	of	the	NPCSC,	a	power	which	even	the	People’s	Supreme	Court	
does	not	enjoy,	caused	an	alarm	to	the	Central	Government.		As	a	result	of	immense	political	
pressure,	the	Director	of	Immigration	made	an	unprecedented	application	inviting	the	Court	to	
clarify	this	part	of	its	judgment.		The	Bar	attempted	unsuccessfully	to	intervene	on	the	ground	
that	the	Court	had	no	jurisdiction	to	entertain	such	an	application	once	its	judgment	had	been	
delivered	and	sealed.		In	a	controversial	judgment	the	Court	made	a	clarification	which	had	the	
virtue	of	not	clarifying	anything.			
Despite	the	clarification,	the	judgment	of	the	Court	was	effectively	reversed	by	the	
Interpretation	of	the	NPCSC.		The	Interpretation	casts	considerable	doubt	over	the	
independence	of	the	judiciary	and	the	integrity	of	the	common	law	system	under	the	notion	of	
‘one	country,	two	systems’.	
2.2.2	 On	Representative	Government:	The	Second	and	Third	Interpretations	
The	Second	and	Third	Interpretations	of	the	NPCSC	have	inflicted	a	different	kind	of	
wound.		Both	are	related	to	the	development	of	representative	government	in	Hong	Kong.		The	
Basic	Law	has	prescribed	the	composition	and	methods	of	formation	of	the	first	three	Legislative	
Council,	and	a	procedure	for	their	amendments	after	2007	‘if	there	is	a	need’	to	do	so.		There	
are	similar	provisions	for	the	selection	of	the	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR	Government.		In	light	
of	the	strong	public	demands	for	the	introduction	of	direct	election	by	universal	suffrage	of	the	
Chief	Executive	and	the	Legislative	Council	in	2007	and	2008	respectively,	the	NPCSC,	in	April	
2004,	decided,	in	the	Second	Interpretation,	that	the	power	to	initiate	any	constitutional	reform	
was	vested	in	the	NPCSC.		The	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR	should	submit	a	report	as	regards	
whether	there	was	any	need	to	make	an	amendment,	and	the	NPCSC	should	make	a	
determination	in	light	of	the	actual	situation	in	the	HKSAR	and	in	accordance	with	the	principle	
of	gradual	and	orderly	progress.21		It	later	decided	that	there	was	no	need	to	make	any	
amendment	to	then	prevailing	methods	of	selection	of	the	Chief	Executive	in	2007	and	the	
formation	of	the	Legislative	Council	in	2008,	and	while	the	size	of	the	Legislative	Council	might	
be	enlarged	in	2008,	there	should	be	an	equal	number	of	members	returned	respectively	by	
geographical	election	and	functional	constituency	election.22	
																																								 																				
21	BLHK,	art	45.	
22		See	further	below.	
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The	Third	Interpretation	was	prompted	by	the	resignation	of	Mr	C	H	Tung,	the	first	Chief	
Executive	of	the	HKSAR,	who	tendered	his	resignation	half	way	in	his	second	term	of	office.		The	
issue	was	whether	his	successor	should	serve	the	remainder	of	the	second	term	of	office	or	
whether	he	should	serve	a	full	term	of	5	years.		Prima	facie,	this	was	a	relatively	straight	forward	
issue	of	statutory	interpretation	which	could	have	easily	been	handled	within	the	Hong	Kong	
legal	system.			Indeed,	an	application	for	judicial	review	was	lodged	on	4	April	2005	inviting	the	
Hong	Kong	court	to	interpret	the	relevant	provisions	in	the	Basic	Law	on	this	matter.		However,	
at	the	invitation	of	the	HKSAR	Government,	the	NPCSC	rendered	its	Third	Interpretation	on	26	
April	2005	deciding	that	the	succeeding	Chief	Executive	should	only	serve	the	remainder	of	the	
term	of	his	predecessor.		The	reason	for	the	hurried	interpretation	was	that	the	succeeding	
Chief	Executive	had	to	be	selected	by	10	July,	and	the	judicial	process	would	take	a	long	time	to	
conclude,	thereby	adversely	affecting	the	administration	and	the	normal	operation	of	the	
HKSAR	Government.			
	
2.2.3 The	Congo	Case	and	its	aftermath	
On	26	August	2010,	the	NPCSC	rendered	its	Fourth	Interpretation	on	the	Basic	Law.		This	
interpretation	was	different	from	the	previous	interpretations	because	there	was	a	referral	by	
the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	for	the	first	time.	In	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	v	FG	Hemisphere	
Associates	LLC,23	the	applicant	attempted	to	enforce	in	Hong	Kong	two	international	arbitral	
awards	against	the	Congo	Government	by	asking	the	Hong	Kong	Court	to	direct	a	PRC	state	own	
enterprise	to	pay	the	fees	it	owed	to	the	Congo	Government	under	a	mining	agreement	to	
satisfy	the	arbitral	award.		In	defence,	the	Congo	Government	pleaded	state	immunity	and	
argued	that,	as	a	sovereign	government,	it	was	immune	from	civil	suit	in	Hong	Kong.		The	Court	
of	Appeal	rejected	this	plea	of	absolute	state	immunity,	holding	that	under	the	common	law,	
state	immunity	would	not	apply	if	the	act	involved	was	a	purely	commercial	act.		The	PRC	
Government	submitted	through	the	Secretary	for	Justice	that	the	Central	Government	
subscribed	to	the	policy	of	absolute	state	immunity	and	that	Hong	Kong,	being	part	of	China,	
had	to	follow	the	same	foreign	policy.	The	Court	of	Final	Appeal	held,	by	a	majority	of	3	to	2,	
that	the	extent	of	state	immunity	fell	within	‘acts	of	state	such	as	defence	and	foreign	affairs’	
under	Art	19(3)	of	the	Basic	Law	and	hence,	under	Article	158(3)	of	the	Basic	Law,	it	was	bound	
to	refer	the	relevant	questions	to	the	NPCSC	for	interpretation,	including	whether	the	HKSAR	
was	bound	to	apply	the	rules	or	policies	on	state	immunity	as	determined	by	the	Central	
Government	and	whether	the	common	law	rule	of	restrictive	state	immunity	was	inconsistent	
with	the	Basic	Law.		A	powerful	minority	judgment	held	that	sovereignty	was	not	invoked	in	this	
case	as	neither	the	PRC	Government	nor	the	PRC	state	owned	enterprise	was	involved	in	the	
case.		The	issue	was	purely	one	of	common	law,	and	under	the	common	law,	a	state	enjoyed	
only	restrictive	state	immunity.		The	minority	further	held	that	even	if	a	state	enjoyed	absolute	
																																								 																				
23	[2011]	4	HKC	151.	
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state	immunity,	it	had	waived	its	immunity	by	subjecting	itself	to	the	arbitration	proceedings.		
On	the	minority	view,	this	would	be	the	end	of	the	matter	and	there	was	no	need	to	refer	any	
question	to	the	NPCSC	for	interpretation.	
In	its	Interpretation,	the	NPCSC	stated	that	the	rules	or	policies	on	state	immunity	fell	
within	the	realm	of	foreign	affairs	of	the	state	and	the	Central	Government	had	the	power	to	
determine	such	rules	or	policies	to	be	given	effect	uniformly	in	its	territory,	including	the	HKSAR.		
The	determination	of	the	rules	or	policies	of	state	immunity	was	also	‘an	act	of	state	such	as	
defence	and	foreign	affairs’	within	the	meaning	of	Art	19(3)	of	the	Basic	Law	and	was	hence	
outside	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Hong	Kong’s	courts.		Therefore,	when	questions	of	immunity	from	
jurisdiction	and	immunity	from	execution	of	foreign	states	and	their	property	arose	in	the	
course	of	judicial	adjudication,	the	Hong	Kong	courts	must	apply	and	give	effect	to	the	rules	or	
policies	on	state	immunity	as	determined	by	the	Central	People’s	Government	and	any	common	
law	principles	were,	to	the	extent	of	incompatibility	with	such	rules	or	policies,	not	adopted	as	
the	laws	of	the	HKSAR.	Given	the	stances	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	that	were	expressed	
through	the	Secretary	for	Justice	in	the	course	of	the	legal	proceedings	in	Hong	Kong,	the	
Interpretation	came	as	no	surprise.			
While	there	is	much	to	be	said	in	favour	of	the	powerful	minority	judgments,	the	
majority	cannot	be	faulted	for	its	decision	that	this	is	a	matter	on	foreign	affairs	which	should	be	
determined	by	the	Central	Government.		Meanwhile,	as	the	first	referral	from	the	Court	of	Final	
Appeal,	it	is	significant	that	the	Court	has	laid	down	the	following	procedural	markers:			
1. The	Court	will	hear	full	submissions	from	the	parties	to	the	proceedings	before	it	
decides	whether	to	make	a	referral.			
2. In	hearing	submissions	from	the	parties,	the	Court	is	prepared	to	consider	any	
submission	of	the	Central	Government	through	the	Secretary	for	Justice.		
3. The	Court	frames	the	questions	to	be	referred	to	the	NPCSC	for	interpretation.			
4. The	Court	renders	its	opinion,	tentative	in	nature,	on	the	substantive	issues	so	that	
the	NPCSC	has	the	benefit	of	a	considered	judgment	of	the	highest	court	of	the	
HKSAR	that	is	well	versed	in	the	common	law	approach.			
	
2.2.4 From	a	royal	edict	to	a	constitutional	convention	
The	interpretation	of	the	Basic	Law	has	become	the	natural	battlefield	for	defining	
autonomy.		In	the	first	three	incidents	of	interpretation	of	the	Basic	Law,	the	extent	of	
autonomy	is	directly	in	issue.		On	the	first	occasion,	it	was	done	to	address	the	difficult	
consequences	arising	from	a	decision	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal.		This		situation	is	not	an	
uncommon	in	many	jurisdictions	where	the	Government	has	to	deal	with	a	judicial	decision	that	
has	unpalatable	economic,	social	or	political	consequences.		In	a	common	law	system,	the	usual	
manner	of	resolving	this	problem	is	to	introduce	new	legislation	or	an	amendment	of	the	
constitution	as	appropriate.		The	legislative	process	would	allow	the	community	through	its	
elected	representatives	an	opportunity	to	fully	debate	the	issues.		In	the	case	of	Hong	Kong,	the	
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power	to	amend	the	constitution	lies	in	Beijing	and	not	in	Hong	Kong.		Taking	a	view	that	the	
Basic	Law	should	not	be	lightly	amended,	the	Central	Government	has	resorted	to	the	
interpretation	route	to	address	this	problem.		As	shown	above,	the	first	interpretation	was	done	
at	the	expense	of	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	and	at	a	great	social	cost.			
On	the	second	and	third	occasions	of	interpreting	the	Basic	Law,	the	NPCSC	conveys	a	
loud	and	clear	message	that	while	prepared	to	tolerate	a	high	degree	of	autonomy	in	internal	
affairs,	Beijing,	and	not	Hong	Kong,	is	in	control	when	it	comes	to	the	democratic	development	
of	the	political	process	of	Hong	Kong.		The	Central	Government	is	not	contend	with	just	having	a	
final	veto	power	to	disallow	any	proposed	change	to	the	method	of	formation	of	the	Legislature	
or	the	selection	of	the	Chief	Executive,	but	it	wants	full	control	to	decide	whether	any	change	is	
proposed	in	the	first	place.			
The	NPCSC	is	obliged,	before	exercising	its	power	of	interpretation,	to	consult	the	Basic	
Law	Committee,	which	has	served	nothing	more	than	a	rubber	stamp.		With	a	highly	
asymmetrical	power	relationship,	the	NPCSC	interpretations	reaffirm	that	while	Hong	Kong	
enjoys	a	high	degree	of	autonomy,	the	extent	of	autonomy	rests	on	a	rather	precarious	basis	
and	lies	at	the	pleasure	of	the	Central	Government.		
Nevertheless,	the	process	of	interpretation	has	been	subject	to	some	refinements.		In	
the	first	interpretation,	the	NPCSC	just	made	the	interpretation	and	announced	it.		In	the	second	
interpretation,	some	Mainland	members	of	the	NPCSC	came	to	Hong	Kong	to	explain	the	
interpretation	after	it	has	been	made.		In	the	third	interpretation,	some	Mainland	members	of	
the	NPCSC	met	with	some	selected	people	and	groups	in	Shenzhen	before	it	made	the	
interpretation.		On	the	fourth	occasion,	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	developed	some	procedural	
requirements	to	minimize	the	occurrence	of	an	arbitrary	decision,	and	these	procedures	could	
have	the	potential	of	being	developed	into	constitutional	conventions	governing	judicial	referral	
to	the	NPCSC.		It	was	also	encouraging	to	see	that	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	was	prepared	
to	take	part	in	the	Hong	Kong	proceedings,	albeit	indirectly,	through	the	submissions	of	the	
Secretary	for	Justice	to	the	Hong	Kong	courts,	not	only	on	the	question	of	referral	but	also	on	
the	substantive	merits	of	the	case.		Instead	of	just	handing	down	a	royal	edict,	the	prospect	of	
making	the	interpretation	process	more	interactive	and	more	participatory	seems	hopeful.	
	
2.3 National	Security:	Art	23	legislation	
National	security	is	another	controversial	issue	that	may	affect	the	extent	of	autonomy.		
For	the	Central	Government,	a	major	concern	is	that	Hong	Kong	should	not	be	turned	into	a	
counter-revolutionary	basis	that	may	threaten	the	authority	or	legitimacy	of	the	ruling	
Government	in	the	Mainland.			
Article	23	of	the	Basic	Law	provides	that	‘Hong	Kong	shall	enact	laws	on	its	own	to	
prohibit	any	act	of	treason,	secession,	sedition,	subversion	against	the	Central	People’s	
Government,	or	theft	of	state	secrets,	to	prohibit	foreign	political	organizations	or	bodies	from	
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conducting	political	activities	in	the	Region,	and	to	prohibit	political	organizations	or	bodies	of	
the	Region	from	establishing	ties	with	foreign	political	organizations	or	bodies’.		There	is	no	
national	security	law	as	such	in	Hong	Kong,	although	some	of	these	activities	are	already	
prohibited	by	Hong	Kong	law.		In	late	2002,	the	Government	proposed	to	introduce	legislation	to	
implement	Article	23.		The	proposal	immediately	sparked	off	strong	opposition	from	many	
quarters,	worrying	that	the	proposed	legislation	has	gone	well	beyond	the	existing	law	and	
could	be	used	as	a	means	to	suppress	any	dissenting	views.		Those	who	supported	the	proposed	
legislation	argued	that	no	country	could	afford	not	to	have	national	security	law,	and	reiterated	
the	threat	that	Hong	Kong	could	be	exploited	as	a	counter-revolutionary	basis.		Those	who	
opposed	the	proposed	legislation	criticized	the	draconian	nature	of	the	proposals,	and	argued	
that	the	existing	law	was	more	than	adequate	to	protect	national	security.		A	highly	influential	
group	known	as	Article	23	Concern	Group,	which	comprised	four	former	chairpersons	of	the	
Hong	Kong	Bar	Association,	was	formed	and	soon	became	the	figurative	leaders	of	the	
opposition.		The	Government’s	case	was	not	helped	by	its	refusal	to	publish	a	White	Bill	for	
public	consultation	(as	it	perceived	the	call	for	a	White	Bill	was	nothing	more	than	a	delaying	
tactic	by	the	opposition)	when	there	was	no	urgency	for	the	Bill,	and	its	insistence	to	push	
through	the	legislation,	believing	that	it	had	sufficient	votes	at	the	Legislative	Council	to	secure	
its	passage.		
	
On	1	July	2003,	instead	of	celebrating	the	7th	anniversary	of	the	resumption	of	
sovereignty	of	Hong	Kong,	about	500,000	people	went	to	the	street	to	demonstrate	against,	
among	other	things,	the	proposed	national	security	law.		The	“SARS	epidemic	attacks”	and	the	
economic	depression	were	among	the	contributing	causes	for	this	large	scale	demonstration.		
Despite	the	large	turnout	in	the	demonstration,	the	Government	still	decided	to	push	through	
the	legislation	until	James	Tien,	chairman	of	the	Liberal	Party,	resigned	from	the	Executive	
Council	shortly	after	the	demonstration	and	indicated	that	his	party	would	not	support	the	
proposed	legislation.	By	then	the	Government	had	to	accept	that	it	would	not	have	sufficient	
votes	in	the	Legislative	Council	to	secure	the	passage	of	the	bill,	and	as	a	result	it	withdrew	the	
bill.	
	
While	the	withdrawal	of	the	national	security	bill	was	heralded	as	a	victory	of	the	
people’s	power,	the	victory	was	ephemeral.		The	real	issue	surrounding	Art	23	is	not	whether	
Hong	Kong	is	under	any	threat	of	activities	that	may	endanger	national	security,	but	how	far	the	
Central	Government	is	prepared	to	tolerate	Hong	Kong	as	a	basis	for	all	kinds	of	‘politically	
undesirable	activities’	against	the	Central	Government.	
III.	 Internal	Autonomy	
3.1 The	Development	of	Constitutionalism	
Once	we	move	away	from	central/local	relationships,	Hong	Kong	does	enjoy	a	high	
degree	of	internal	autonomy	(except	in	the	area	of	democratic	development,	which	will	be	
addressed	below).		In	a	common	law	system	like	Hong	Kong,	the	courts,	and	particularly	the	
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Court	of	Final	Appeal,	play	a	pivotal	role	in	constitutional	development.		Space	constraints	will	
not	permit	a	full	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	courts	in	constitutional	development.		This	section	
will	focus	on	a	few	recent	decisions	that	have	a	bearing	on	the	autonomy	of	Hong	Kong.	
3.2 Independence	of	the	Judiciary	
An	independent	judiciary	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	common	law	system	and	the	rule	of	law.		
For	political	reasons,,	it	was	inappropriate	to	retain	the	Judicial	Committee	of	the	Privy	Council	
as	the	court	of	final	appeal	for	Hong	Kong	after	the	changeover.		Hence,	the	Basic	Law	provides	
for	the	establishment	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal,	which	may	invite	judges	from	other	common	
law	jurisdictions	to	serve	on	the	Court.		Upon	its	establishment,	the	first	Chief	Justice	set	up	a	
panel	of	overseas	judges,	and	established	a	convention	that	there	will	be	an	overseas	judge	in	
every	substantive	appeal.		Hong	Kong	is	fortunate	to	have	the	service	of	some	of	the	most	
distinguished	jurists	in	the	common	law	world.		Their	extensive	knowledge	and	experience	have	
enriched	the	jurisprudence	of	the	Hong	Kong	courts,	and	their	stature	and	undoubted	
impartiality	have	strengthened	the	credibility	and	reputation	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	and	
the	judiciary	of	Hong	Kong.		Independence	of	the	judiciary	is	further	buttressed	by	various	
systemic	guarantees	in	the	Basic	Law,	including	the	system	of	appointment,	promotion	and	
removal	of	judges.	
	
As	discussed	above,	the	First	Interpretation	of	the	NPCSC	posed	one	of	the	first	major	
challenges	to	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	in	Hong	Kong.		There	were	concerns	that	a	
political	organ	can	easily	reverse	the	considered	judgment	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal.	There	
were	also	concerns	whether	as	a	result	a	judge	would	always	have	to	look	over	his	shoulder	to	
take	into	account	how	his	decision	would	be	received	by	the	Central	Government.		In	Chong	
Fung	Yuen	v	Director	of	Immigration,	the	Court	dispelled	such	concerns	by	emphasizing	the	
independent	judicial	power	and	its	exclusive	role	of	interpreting	the	law,	subject	only	to	the	
limit	on	the	court’s	jurisdiction.24		It	was	held	that	these	principles	flow	from	the	doctrine	of	
separation	of	powers;	they	are	the	basic	principles	of	the	common	law	that	have	been	preserved	
and	maintained	in	Hong	Kong	by	the	Basic	Law.		The	Chief	Justice	further	explained	this	common	
law	approach	to	interpretation	as	an	objective	process	that	is	not	influenced	or	dictated	by	the	
intent	of	the	lawmaker	or	by	any	extrinsic	factors	other	than	the	intent	of	the	legislature	as	
expressed	through	the	language	of	the	legislation:25	
	
‘The	courts’	role	under	the	common	law	in	interpreting	the	Basic	Law	is	to	construe	the	
language	used	in	the	text	of	the	instrument	in	order	to	ascertain	the	legislative	intent	as	
expressed	in	the	language.		Their	task	is	not	to	ascertain	the	intent	of	the	lawmaker	on	
its	own.		Their	duty	is	to	ascertain	what	was	meant	by	the	language	used	and	to	give	
effect	to	the	legislative	intent	as	expressed	in	the	language.		It	is	the	text	of	the	
																																								 																				
24	(2001)	4	HKCFAR	211	at	223.	
25	Ibid.	
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enactment	which	is	the	law	and	it	is	regarded	as	important	both	that	the	law	should	be	
certain	and	that	it	should	be	ascertainable	by	the	citizen.’	(italics	original)	
In	the	same	case,	the	Court	tried	to	minimize	the	influence	of	the	NPCSC	by	labeling	the	
process	as	a	legislative	process	no	different	from	other	legislative	processes.26		Subject	to	any	
constitutional	constraint,	the	legislature	is	free	to	reverse	a	judgment	of	the	court	that	the	
legislature	considers	unacceptable	politically,	socially	or	economically.		This		phenomenon	is	a	
consequence	of	a	separation	of	powers,	and	the	check	against	legislative	abuse	lies	in	the	
representative	legislature.		Thus,	if	necessary,	the	constitution	can	be	amended.		The	only	
difference	is	that	the	Basic	Law	can	be	amended	or	‘interpreted’	in	a	way	that	is	not	familiar	to	
the	common	law	system,	but	this	is	a	political	fact	that	has	to	be	acknowledged,	if	not	accepted.		
The	Court,	however,	would	not	pay	heed	to	how	the	legislature	or	the	NPCSC	would	react	to	its	
judicial	interpretation,	for	otherwise	the	independence	of	the	judiciary	would	have	been	
compromised.	
In	Chen	Li	Hung	v	Ting	Lei	Miao,	the	Court	faced	the	highly	political	issue	of	recognition	
of	Taiwan	as	a	political	entity.27	The	issue	is	whether	the	Hong	Kong	court	should	recognize	and	
give	effect	to	a	bankruptcy	order	made	by	the	Taiwan	court	in	Hong	Kong,	given	that	the	
Taiwanese	Government	was	not	recognized	by	the	PRC	Government.		The	Court	held	that	the	
order	would	be	given	effect	in	Hong	Kong	as	the	rights	covered	by	the	order	were	private	rights,	
that	giving	effect	to	such	order	accorded	with	the	interest	of	justice,	the	dictates	of	common	
sense	and	the	needs	of	law	and	order,	and	giving	the	order	effect	would	not	be	inimical	to	the	
sovereign’s	interests	or	otherwise	contrary	to	public	policy.		It	drew	a	distinction	between	
recognition	of	a	usurper	or	rebellious	regime	and	giving	effect	to	the	order	of	a	court	with	de	
facto	power	without	de	jure	authority.		Quoting	from	Lord	Donaldson	MR	that	‘it	is	one	thing	to	
treat	a	state	or	government	as	being	“without	the	law”	but	quite	another	to	treat	the	
inhabitants	of	its	territory	as	“outlaws”	who	cannot	effectively	marry,	beget	legitimate	children,	
purchase	goods	on	credit	or	undertake	countless	day-to-day	activities	having	legal	
consequences,’28the	Court	steered	skillfully	and	carefully	between	law	and	politics	and	was	
prepared	to	come	to	a	pragmatic	decision	in	accordance	with	justice	and	common	sense	by	
avoiding	high	level	politics,	even	when	its	decision	was	to	be	founded	upon	on	a	single	dictum	of	
Lord	Wilberforce	in	a	case	of	forty	years	of	age.29	Lord	Cooke	found	that,	as	an	overseas	judge,	
he	might	have	a	particular	role	to	play.		He	summed	up	succinctly	the	sentiment	and	approach	
of	the	Court	in	his	separate	concurring	judgment:		
																																								 																				
26	While	this	explanation	of	distancing	the	NPCSC	Interpretation	from	the	judicial	process	helps	preserve	
the	independence	of	the	judiciary,	it	does	not	work	well	in	the	case	of	judicial	referral.		For	more	detail,	
see	J	Chan,	‘’Basic	Law	and	Constitutional	Review’	(2007)	37	HKLJ	407	at	415-419;	J	Chan	&	C	L	Lim	(eds),	
Law	of	the	Hong	Kong	Constitution	(Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2011),	paras	2.077-2.090,	10.061-10.063	and	
16.017-16.022.	
27		 [2000]	1	JKC	461.	
28		 GUR	Corp	v	Trust	Bank	of	Africa	Ltd	[1987]	1	QB	599	at	622.	
29		 Carl	Zeiss	Stiftung	v	Rayner	&	Keeler	Ltd	(No	2)	[1967]	1	AC	853	at	954.	
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‘Viewing	the	case	from	a	different	perspective,	the	issue	is	essentially	between	the	
Taiwan	creditors	on	the	one	hand	and	Mr	Ting,	Madam	Chen	and	Mr	Chan	on	the	other.		
It	is	not	an	issue	with	which	national	politics	have	any	natural	connection.		They	should	
not	be	allowed	to	obtrude	into	or	overshadow	a	question	of	the	private	rights	and	day-
to-day	affairs	of	ordinary	people.		The	ordinary	principles	of	private	international	law	
should	be	applied	without	importing	extraneous	high-level	public	controversy.’30		
3.3 Human	Rights	
The	most	significant	contribution	of	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	lies	in	the	area	of	human	
rights.			On	the	one	hand,	the	Court	soon	established	its	reputation	as	a	liberal	court,	and	on	the	
other	hand,	it	has	displayed	great	sensitivity	in	balancing	competing	demands	and	values	in	the	
community.			In	Leung	Kwok	Hung	v	HKSAR,	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	set	out	the	approach	as	
such:31	
‘It	is	well	established	in	our	jurisprudence	that	the	courts	must	give	such	a	fundamental	
right	[to	freedom	of	peaceful	assembly]	a	generous	interpretation	so	as	to	give	
individuals	its	full	measure.		On	the	other	hand,	restrictions	on	such	a	fundamental	right	
must	be	narrowly	interpreted.		Plainly,	the	burden	is	on	the	Government	to	justify	any	
restriction.		This	approach	to	constitutional	review	involving	fundamental	rights,	which	
has	been	adopted	by	the	Court,	is	consistent	with	that	followed	in	many	jurisdictions.		
Needless	to	say,	in	a	society	governed	by	the	rule	of	law,	the	courts	must	be	vigilant	in	
the	protection	of	fundamental	rights	and	must	rigorously	examine	any	restriction	that	
may	be	placed	on	them.’	
Applying	this	approach,	the	Court	has	in	the	past	decade	laid	down	many	enlightened	
and	interesting	decisions,	trying	to	safeguard	cherished	fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	on	the	
one	hand	and	to	recognize	the	complexity	of	modern	life	and	governance	on	the	other.			Thus,	
the	Court	has	struck	down	statutory	provisions	reversing	the	onus	of	proof	in	criminal	
prosecution,32	provisions	imposing	a	blanket	restriction	on	legal	representation	in	disciplinary	
proceedings,33		unreasonable	restrictions	on	advertising	by	the	medical	profession,34	a	provision	
empowering	the	police	to	prevent	the	holding	of	a	public	assembly	on	the	vague	ground	of	
ordre	public,35	provisions	introducing	a	blanket	regime	to	authorize	covert	surveillance,36	various	
gender-based	discriminatory	sexual	offences,37	sexually	discriminatory	restrictions	on	the	right	
																																								 																				
30		 [2000]	1	HKC	461	at	478.	
31	(2005)	8	HKCFAR	229,	para	16.	
32	Hung	Chan	Wa	v	HKSAR	(2006)	9	HKCFAR	614.	
33	Lam	Siu	Po	v	Commissioner	for	Police	(2009)	12	HKCFAR	237.	
34	Kwok	Hay	Kwong	v	Medical	Council	[2008]	3	HKLRD	524.	
35	Leung	Kwok	Hung	v	HKSAR	(2005)	8	HKCFAR	229.	
36	Leung	Kwok	Hung	v	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR	[2006]	HKEC	816	
37	Leung	v	Secretary	for	Justice	[2006]	4	HKLRD	211.	
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to	elect	village	representatives	in	the	indigenous	villages	in	the	New	Territories,38	and	provisions	
denying	prisoners’	right	to	vote	while	serving	prison	sentence.39	In	a	celebrated	decision	it	held	
that,	given	the	justification	of	free	speech,	the	defence	of	fair	comment	in	defamation	was	not	
defeated	by	the	mere	presence	of	malice.40		In	another	important	decision,	the	Court	suspended	
a	declaration	of	unconstitutionality	for	8	months	to	give	time	to	the	Government	to	introduce	
necessary	remedial	legislation.41	At	the	same	time,	it	upheld	the	controversial	flag	discretion	
offences,42	the	broadcasting	licensing	regime,43	the	school-based	management	system,44	
differential	hospital	charges	for	obstetrics	services	in	public	hospitals	between	Hong	Kong	
Permanent	Residents	and	non-Hong	Kong	Permanent	Residents,	45	and	the	7-year	residence	
requirement	for	Comprehensive	Social	Welfare	Assistance.46	
3.4 Equality	and	Non-discrimination	
Common	law	is	weak	in	offering	protection	against	discriminatory	practices.		If	the	
discriminatory	practices	are	undertaken	by	a	public	authority,	public	law	may	offer	some	
protection.		However,	if	the	discriminatory	measures	are	taken	by	a	private	body,	the	sacrosanct	
notion	of	freedom	of	contract	will	leave	the	victim	of	discrimination	with	little	remedies.			In	this	
regard,	both	the	legislature	and	the	court	have	made	major	inroads	in	cutting	through	the	abyss	
of	freedom	of	contract	by	offering	innovative	protection	and	remedies.			
When	the	Bill	of	Rights	was	introduced	for	the	first	time	into	Hong	Kong	domestic	law	
the	general	principle	against	discrimination,	the	anti-discriminatory	provisions	were	opposed	by	
the	private	sector	on	the	ground	that	discrimination	was	such	a	complex	area	that	it	should	only	
be	introduced	with	an	elaborate	legislative	regime	carefully	balancing	the	rights	and	
responsibilities	of	the	people	affected	and	should	not	be	introduced	as	a	vague	general	
principle.47		Ironically,	when	the	Government	proposed	to	introduce	detailed	legislation	on	this	
subject	a	few	years	later,	the	proposal	was	opposed	by	more	or	less	the	same	group	on	the	
ground	that	discrimination	was	best	combated	by	education	and	not	by	legislation,	and	that	
																																								 																				
38	Secretary	for	Justice	v	Chan	Wah	(2000)	3	HKCFAR	459.	
39	Chan	Kin	Sum	v	Secretary	for	Justice	[2009]	2	HKLRD	166.	
40	Cheng	Albert	v	Tse	Wai	Chun	Paul	[2000]	3	HKLRD	418.	
41	Koo	Sze	Yiu	v	Chief	Executive	HKSAR	(2006)	9	HKCFAR	441.		See	also	Andrew	Li,	‘Reflections	on	the	
Retrospective	and	Prospective	Effect	of	Constitutional	Judgments’,	in	Jessica	Young	and	Rebecca	Lee	(eds),	
The	Common	Law	Lecture	Series	2010	(University	of	Hong	Kong,	2011),	21-55	and	Johannes	Chan,	‘Some	
Reflections	on	Administrative	Law	Remedies’		(2009)	39(2)	HKLJ	321-337.		
42	Ng	Kung	Siu	v	HKSAR	[1999]	3	HKLRD	907.	
43	Secretary	for	Justice	v	Ocean	Technology	Ltd	[2009]	3	HKLRD	F1.	
44	Catholic	Diocese	of	Hong	Kong	v	Secretary	for	Justice	[2011]	HKEC	1350.	
45	Fok	Chun	Wa	v	Hospital	Authority	[2010]	HKEC	713	(CA)(judgment	of	the	CFA	pending)	
46	Kong	Yunming	v	Director	of	Social	Welfare,	CACV	185/2009	(17	Feb	2012)	(on	appeal	to	CFA).	
47	See	.		A	London	silk	was	engaged	by	the	banking	sector	to	argue	how	undesirable	it	would	be	to	
introduce	a	general	principle	of	non-discrimination	in	the	Bill	of	Rights.	See	Andrew	Byrnes,	‘The	Hong	
Kong	Bill	of	Rights	and	Relations	between	Private	Individuals’,	in	Johannes	Chan	and	Yash	Ghai	(eds),	The	
Hong	Kong	Bill	of	Rights:	A	Comparative	Approach	(Buttherworths,	1993),	Ch	5,	at	83-88.	
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legislation	would	impose	undue	financial	burden	on	the	business	sector.		When	the	Government	
showed	no	intention	to	introduce	legislation,	the	Hon	Anna	Wu	decided	to	introduce	by	way	of	
a	private	member	bill	a	comprehensive	non-discrimination	bill.		This	bill	put	strong	pressure	on	
the	Government,	which	eventually	agreed,	as	a	compromise,	to	introduce,	not	a	comprehensive	
bill,	but	a	bill	to	prohibit	discrimination	on	the	ground	of	sex	and	disability.		The	Sex	
Discrimination	Ordinance	and	the	Disability	Discrimination	Ordinance,	followed	later	by	the	
Family	Status	Discrimination	Ordinance	and	Race	Discrimination	Ordinance,	were	introduced,	
alongside	the	establishment	of	the	Equal	Opportunities	Commission.		While	these	statutes	do	
not	cover	the	full	range	of	discrimination,	they	do	provide	a	useful	statutory	framework	that	
begins	to	change	public	attitude	and	practices.	
Mere	difference	in	treatment	is	not	discrimination.		It	is	only	when	the	difference	in	
treatment	cannot	be	justified	that	it	becomes	discrimination.48		In	deciding	whether	the	
difference	in	treatment	can	be	justified,	the	court	considers	whether	the	difference	in	treatment	
is	rationally	related	and	proportionate	to	the	objectives	to	be	achieved.		Thus,	the	court	held	
that	an	exclusion	of	the	male,	but	not	the	female,	non-indigenous	spouse	of	an	indigenous	
inhabitant	of	the	New	Territories	from	the	election	for	the	village	representative		was	
unjustifiable	and	hence	discriminatory.49		It	also	found	different	age	requirements	for	consent	to	
buggery	among	males	and	sexual	intercourse	between	male	and	female	unjustified.50	The	most	
controversial	case	is	probably	Equal	Opportunities	Commission	v	Director	for	Education	where	
the	court	held	that	preferential	treatment	in	favour	of	male	students	in	the	allocation	of	
secondary	school	places	was	unjustified	and	discriminatory,	partly	on	the	ground	of	failure	of	
the	Government	to	produce	evidence	that	boys	were	late	bloomers	and	partly	that	the	system	
had	been	in	operation	for	more	than	20	years	and	could	not	be	regarded	as	a	temporary	
remedial	measure.51		
3.5 Social	and	Economic	Rights	
While	the	courts	have	a	fairly	good	record	in	protecting	civil	and	political	rights,	they	
have	a	mixed	record	in	relation	to	social	and	economic	rights.		In	Chan	To	Foon	v	Director	of	
Immigration,52	the	applicants	invoked	the	right	to	family	life	under	the	International	Covenant	of	
Civil	and	Political	Rights	(ICCPR,)	the	International	Covenant	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	
Rights	(ICESCR)	and	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Children	(CRC)	in	support	of	a	claim	that	the	
mother	enjoyed	a	legitimate	expectation	to	remain	in	Hong	Kong	and	live	with	her	minor	
																																								 																				
48	Secretary	for	Justice	v	Yau	Yuk	Lung	(2007)	10	HKCFAR	335.		
49	Secretary	for	Justice	v	Chan	Wah	(2000)	3	HKCFAR	459.	
50	Leung	v	Secretary	for	Justice	[2006]	4	HKLRD	211.	
51	[2001]	2	HKLRD	690	
52	[2001]	3	HKLRD	109	at	131−134.	See	also	Chan	Mei	Yee	v	Director	of	Immigration	[2000]	HKEC	788;	Mok	
Chi	Hung	v	Director	of	 Immigration	 [2001]	2	HKLRD	125.	For	a	useful	commentary,	see	Carole	Petersen,	
“Embracing	 Universal	 Standards?	 The	 Role	 of	 Human	 Rights	 Treaties	 in	 Hong	 Kong’s	 Constitutional	
Jurisprudence”,	 in	Hualing	Fu,	Lison	Harris,	and	Simon	Young	(eds),	 Interpreting	Hong	Kong’s	Basic	Law:	
The	Struggle	for	Coherence	(New	York,	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2007),	pp	33-53.	
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children,	as	did	the	rest	of	the	family	members.	The	court	held,	following	Chan	Mei	Yee	v	
Director	of	Immigration,	53	that	while	ratification	of	a	treaty	might	give	rise	to	a	legitimate	
expectation,	such	legitimate	expectation	would	be	defeated	by	the	express	reservations	in	the	
ICCPR	and	the	CRC	in	relation	to	the	stay	of	illegal	immigrants	in	Hong	Kong.	There	was	no	
similar	reservation	in	the	ICESCR,	but	Hartmann	J	held	that	the	ICESCR	was	promotional	and	
aspirational	in	nature	and	thus	could	not	create	legally	enforceable	obligations.	This	conclusion	
is	odd,	as	the	claimant	was	relying	on	virtually	the	same	right	in	both	the	ICCPR	and	the	ICESCR.		
It	would	be	difficult	to	support	a	conclusion	that	the	right	to	family	life	under	the	ICCPR	is	
justiciable	whereas	the	same	right	under	the	ICESCR	is	merely	aspirational.	The	judgment	
attracted	strong	criticism	from	the	Committee	on	Economic,	Social	and	Cultural	Rights.	In	its	
Concluding	Observation	on	the	Initial	Report	of	the	Hong	Kong	Special	Administrative	Region,	
the	Committee,	in	an	unusually	strong	language,	“regrets”	the	view	taken	that	the	ICESCR	was	
merely	“promotional”	or	“aspirational”	in	nature.	It	reiterated	that	such	views	were	“based	on	a	
mistaken	understanding	of	the	legal	obligations	arising	from	the	Covenant”,	and	reminded	the	
Government	that	“the	provisions	of	the	Covenant	constitute	a	legal	obligation	on	the	part	of	the	
State	parties”.	The	Committee	“urges	the	Government	not	to	argue	in	court	proceedings	that	
the	Covenant	is	only	‘promotional’	or	‘aspirational’	in	nature”.54	In	its	Reply,	the	Government	
stated,	in	a	half-hearted	manner,	that	“we	note	the	Committee’s	observation	that	the	Covenant	
is	not	merely	“promotional”	or	“aspirational”	in	nature	and	accept	that	it	creates	binding	
obligations	at	the	international	level.”	55	
The	first	generation	of	social	and	economic	right	cases	were	mostly	related	to	the	right	
of	abode	and	immigration	matters.		Given	the	small	vicinity,	dense	population	and	economic	
success	of	Hong	Kong,	which	attracts	a	lot	of	economic	migrants,	it	is	understandable	that	the	
courts	have	not	been	very	sympathetic	to	any	argument	that	may	weaken	immigration	control.		
These	cases	were	further	complicated	by	the	presence	of	a	reservation	clause	in	the	ICCPR	and	
the	Bill	of	Rights	that	essentially	exempts	from	their	scrutiny	all	immigration	decisions	governing	
the	entry	into,	stay	in	and	departure	from	Hong	Kong.		The	second	generation	of	social	and	
economic	rights	cases,	which	began	to	appear	after	2006,	went	beyond	immigration	matters.		
While	the	court	was	prepared	to	take	social	and	economic	rights	more	seriously	at	this	stage,	it	
was	reluctant	to	interfere	with	executive	decisions	or	legislative	choices	by	adopting	a	wide	
margin	of	appreciation	or	invoking	the	doctrine	of	due	deference,	and	more	recently,	by	
adopting	a	lower	level	of	intensity	of	review.56	
																																								 																				
53	[2000]	HKEC	788.	
54	UN	Doc	E/C.12/1/Add	58,	paras	16	and	27	(11	May	2001).			
55	Para	2.11-2.12,	2nd	Periodic	Report	of	the	HKSAR	Government.	
56	See	Kong	Yunming	v	Director	of	Social	Welfare	[2009]	4	HKLRD	382	(CFI);	Catholic	Diocese	of	Hong	Kong	
v	Secretary	for	Justice	[2007]	4	HKLRD	483	(CFI).		See	also	Cora	Chan,	‘Judicial	Deference	at	Work:	Some	
Reflections	on	Chan	Kin	Sum	and	Kong	Yun	Ming’	(2010)	40	HKLJ	1.		
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Deference	is	a	controversial	if	not	also	a	dangerous	concept.57		In	a	system	subscribed	to	
the	doctrine	of	separation	of	powers,	there	would	be	areas	which	are	within	the	exclusive	
domain	of	the	three	branches	of	Government.		The	court,	in	exercising	its	judicial	power,	should	
not	sidestep	into	the	shoes	of	the	Executive.		Wednesbury	unreasonableness	is	a	classic	example	
where	the	court	tries	to	confine	merits	review	to	the	more	extreme	cases.		The	doctrine	of	
proportionality	requires	the	court	to	exercise	a	heightened	degree	of	scrutiny	when	human	
rights	are	at	stake.		The	doctrine	of	deference	tries	to	put	a	brake	to	aggressive	judicial	review	
on	merits.		It	is	traditionally	justified	either	on	democratic	grounds,	namely	that	court	lacks	the	
mandate	and	legitimacy	to	second	guess	the	wisdom	of	a	democratically	elected	body,	or	on	the	
ground	of	a	lack	of	expertise	and	information.		While	these	are	powerful	justifications,	the	risk	is	
that	whenever	the	doctrine	of	deference	is	invoked,	it	usually	results	in	a	rather	loose	standard	
of	review,	and	the	court	fails	to	consider	the	justifications	at	all.		It	has	been	less	of	a	problem	in	
civil	and	political	rights,	where	the	court	stressed	that	that	‘deference	must	not	be	carried	to	the	
point	of	relieving	the	government	of	the	burden	which	a	constitution	places	upon	it	
demonstrating	that	the	limits	it	has	imposed	on	guaranteed	rights	a	reasonable	and	justifiable.’			
However,	the	same	degree	of	vigilance	is	not	seen	in	social	and	economic	rights.	
In	Kong	Yunming	v	Director	of	Social	Welfare,	the	issue	was	whether	the	introduction	of	
an	eligibility	requirement	of	7-year	residence	violated	the	right	to	social	welfare	of	Hong	Kong	
Residents	(who	were	granted	a	right	to	enter	Hong	Kong	for	settlement	but	not	yet	acquired	the	
status	of	Hong	Kong	Permanent	Residents),	contrary	to	Article	36	of	the	Basic	Law.		Both	the	
Court	of	First	Instance	and	the	Court	of	Appeal	emphasized	that	it	would	be	slow	to	enter	into	
questions	concerning	the	allocation	of	scarce	resources;	an	issue	that	is	inherent	in	the	
adjudication	of	social	and	economic	rights.58		Stock	JA	pointed	out	that	Article	36	of	the	Basic	
Law	did	not	specify	any	particular	type	or	level	of	social	welfare.		Article	145	further	provides	
that	the	Government	can,	“on	the	basis	of	the	previous	social	welfare	system”,	formulate	
policies	on	the	development	and	improvement	of	this	system	in	light	of	economic	conditions	
and	social	needs.	Thus,	the	Court	of	Appeal	concluded	that	the	determinations	of	appropriate	
kinds	of	social	welfare	would	be	a	matter	for	the	Executive	Government.		The	Court	of	First	
Instance	suggested	that	the	Court	should	give	deference	to	the	decision	of	the	Executive	
Government	and	should	not	interfere	with	its	decision	unless	its	decision	was	discriminatory.		
While	Stock	JA	preferred	not	to	adopt	the	notion	of	deference,	the	learned	judge	held	that	the	
court	would	adopt	a	low	level	of	intensity	of	review	in	matters	involving	Government	policy	on	
allocation	of	resources.		Lam	J,	in	his	concurring	judgment,	went	further	to	hold	that	the	Court	
would	not	intervene	unless	the	decision	of	the	Government	was	Wednesbury	unreasonable,	a	
test	which	has	long	been	abandoned	in	human	rights	cases.		The	level	of	judicial	scrutiny	is	so	
low	that	the	effect	of	the	judgment	would	render	the	right	to	social	welfare	nothing	more	than	
																																								 																				
57	See	Jeffrey	Jowell,	‘Judicial	Deference:	Servility,	Civility	or	Industrial	Capacity’	[2003]	Public	Law	492-
601;T	R	S	Allan:	A		Critique	of	“Due	Deference,	‘Human	Rights	and	Judicial	Review		[2006]	63	Cambridge	
Law	Journal	671-695	
58	CACV	185/2009	(17	Feb	2012).	
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rhetorical.		While	it	is	not	argued	that	the	court	should	step	into	the	shoes	of	the	Executive	
Government,	it	must	be	remembered	that	it	is	for	the	court	to	determine	legality,	and	it	is	not	
easy	to	determine	legality	without	scrutinizing	the	justifications	put	forward	by	the	Government	
in	restricting	fundamental	rights,	whether	civil	and	political	or	social	and	economic	in	nature.	
On	the	whole,	the	courts	have	adopted	a	fairly	liberal	approach	towards	the	protection	
of	civil	and	political	rights.		They	have	adopted	a	sensible	and	pragmatic	approach	that	tries	to	
secure	a	fair	balance	among	competing	interests	with	a	bias	in	favour	of	individual	rights	and	
freedoms.		Yet,	they	have	been	more	cautious	and	conservative	in	relation	to	economic,	social	
and	cultural	rights.	While	such	caution	may	be	understandable,	the	prevalent	wisdom	in	
international	human	rights	jurisprudence	is	that	while	there	are	some	differences	between	
these	two	sets	of	rights,	the	differences	are	more	apparent	than	real	in	most	cases,	as	the	
classification	of	these	rights	are	not	water-tight	and	the	scope	of	many	rights	overlap	with	one	
another.59		The	distinction	may	be	further	blurred	when	rights	such	as	the	right	to	family	life	is	
to	be	found	in	both	ICCPR	and	ICESCR.		There	are	some	indications	that	the	court	may	be	
prepared	to	take	social	and	economic	rights	more	seriously	in	the	future,	while	at	the	same	time	
affording	the	Government	a	fairly	wide	margin	of	appreciation	on	the	basis	that	social	and	
economic	rights	involve	the	allocation	of	resources,	which	is	something	that	falls	outside	the	
competence	of	the	judiciary.		The	full	extent	of	this	approach	is	yet	to	be	tested,	as	after	all,	very	
few	rights	are	free	in	that	sense	that	their	protection	would	not	involve	resources.		While	the	
court	has	advised	against	adopting	the	doctrine	of	deference,	the	current	stage	of	jurisprudence	
seems	to	be	a	matter	of	semantics	than	substances	in	that	the	term	‘deference’	merely	replaced	
by	a	different	formulation	of	a	low	level	of	scrutiny.		The	difficulty	is	that	a	low	level	of	scrutiny	
will	easily	result	in	a	failure	to	exercise	any	meaningful	judicial	scrutiny	of	executive	or	legislative	
decisions.		It	is	not	easy	to	draw	the	dividing	line,	and	one	can	only	await	further	authoritative	
guidance	from	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal.		Here	the	courts	will	enter	into	the	difficult	task	of	
determining	complex	questions	of	fact,	degree	and	value.		At	this	stage,	a	more	promising	and	
practical	approach	towards	litigating	social	and	economic	rights	would	be	to	rely	on	alternative,	
more	conventional	grounds	such	as	the	right	to	equality	before	the	law,	although	the	Court	is	
right	that	social	and	economic	rights	encompass	more	than	a	right	not	to	be	discriminated	
against	in	their	enjoyment.	
IV.	 Democratic	Development	in	Hong	Kong	
4.1 Democratic	Development	
	
Another	litmus	test	of	autonomy	would	be	the	extent	of	self-government	in	Hong	Kong.			
Article	68	of	the	Basic	Law	stipulates	that	the	Legislative	Council	of	the	HKSAR	‘shall	be	
constituted	by	election’.		The	method	for	forming	the	Legislative	Council	shall	be	specified	in	the	
																																								 																				
59	For	example,	the	right	to	self-determination	and	the	right	to	family	exist	in	both	ICCPR	and	ICESCR.		The	
right	to	strike	and	the	right	to	form	trade	union	are	found	in	the	ICESCR,	which	may	also	form	part	of	the	
right	to	freedom	of	expression	and	peaceful	assembly	and	the	right	to	association.	
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light	of	the	actual	situation	in	the	HKSAR	and	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	gradual	and	
orderly	progress.		The	ultimate	aim	is	the	election	of	all	the	members	of	the	Legislative	Council	
by	universal	suffrage.		The	composition	of	the	second	and	third	terms	of	the	Legislative	Council	
is	stipulated	in	Annex	II	of	the	Basic	Law,	which	further	provides	that	if	there	is	a	need	to	amend	
the	method	of	formation	of	the	Legislative	Council	after	2007,	such	amendments	must	be	made	
with	the	endorsement	of	a	two-third	majority	of	all	the	members	of	the	Legislative	Council	and	
the	consent	of	the	Chief	Executive,	and	the	amendments	shall	be	reported	to	the	NPCSC	for	the	
record.	
	
The	democratic	movement	in	Hong	Kong	gathered	momentum	after	the	massive	
demonstration	in	July	2003	leading	to	the	withdrawal	by	the	Government	of	the	controversial	
national	security	bill.		There	were	strong	public	demands	for	a	fully	elected	Legislative	Council	in	
2008.		In	April	2004,	the	NPCSC	decided	on	its	own	motion	in	its	second	interpretation	that	the	
power	to	initiate	any	democratic	reform	was	vested	in	the	NPCSC,	reminding	the	people	of	Hong	
Kong	that	there	could	not	be	any	constitutional	reform	without	the	consent	of	the	Central	
Government.		The	NPCSC	laid	down	a	procedure	that	the	Chief	Executive	of	the	HKSAR	shall	
submit	a	report	regarding	whether	there	is	any	need	to	make	an	amendment	to	the	provisions	
of	Annex	II,	and	the	NPCSC	shall	make	a	determination	in	light	of	the	actual	situation	in	the	
HKSAR	and	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	gradual	and	orderly	progress.		On	the	basis	that	
there	was	no	consensus	in	Hong	Kong	on	the	abolition	of	functional	constituency	election,	the	
NPCSC	subsequently	decided	that	there	was	no	need	to	change	the	method	of	formation	of	the	
Legislative	Council	in	2008.		Minor	changes	to	increase	the	number	of	directly	elected	seats	
were	permissible,	provided	that	the	proportion	between	the	members	returned	respectively	by	
geographical	election	and	functional	constituency	election	should	remain	unchanged.	
	
The	Constitutional	Task	Force	of	the	HKSAR	Government	conducted	further	public	
consultations	on	the	further	reform	of	the	Legislative	Council	in	2008,	resulting	in	the	
publication	of	its	Fifth	Report	in	October	2005.		It	proposed,	among	other	things,	that	the	
membership	of	the	Legislative	Council	be	expanded	from	60	to	70.		Half	of	the	ten	new	seats	
would	be	returned	by	geographical	direct	election,	and	the	remaining	half	would	be	returned	by	
election	among	members	of	the	District	Councillors,	who	themselves	were	returned	by	both	
geographical	election	and	appointment	by	the	Government.		The	pan-democrats	argued	that	
the	appointed	District	Councillors	(about	20%	of	all	District	Councillors)	should	be	excluded	from	
the	electoral	college	of	District	Councillors,	and	that	the	Government	should	provide	a	timetable	
and	roadmap	for	the	introduction	of	universal	suffrage.		The	negotiation	broke	down,	and	the	
proposal	was	narrowly	defeated	as	the	Government	was	unable	to	secure	a	two-third	majority	
of	the	members	of	the	Legislative	Council	to	endorse	the	proposal	–	a	move	that	sharply	divided	
the	pan-democrats	and	the	pro-establishment	forces	and	reinforced	the	suspicion	and	distrust	
of	the	Central	Government	towards	the	pan-democrats	in	Hong	Kong.	
	
Having	lost	the	battle	for	introducing	direct	election	in	2008,	the	pan-democrats	shifted	
their	focus	to	demand	for	direct	elections	of	both	the	Legislative	Council	and	the	Chief	Executive	
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in	2012.			Further	consultations	were	carried	out	in	Hong	Kong.		Under	Article	45	of	the	Basic	
Law,	the	Chief	Executive	was	selected	by	an	Election	Committee,	which	was	supposed	to	be	a	
broadly	representative	body	comprising	members	from	four	major	sectors.60			Similar	to	the	
arrangement	in	Annex	II	for	the	Legislative	Council,	Annex	I	of	the	Basic	Law	provides	that	if	
there	is	any	need	to	change	the	method	for	selecting	the	Chief	Executive	after	2007,	such	
amendments	shall	be	made	with	the	endorsement	of	a	two-thirds	majority	of	all	the	members	
of	the	Legislative	Council	and	the	consent	of	the	Chief	Executive,	except	that,	unlike	the	case	for	
Legislative	Council,	such	amendments	shall	be	reported	to	the	NPCSC	for	approval	and	not	just	
for	record.		The	Election	Committee	was	criticized	for	its	unrepresentativeness,	as	their	
members	are	drawn	from	elite	groups	that	resemble	the	functional	constituency	election.	
	
In	December	2007,	the	NPCSC	rejected	the	claim	for	direct	election	in	2012,	but	it	laid	
down	a	timetable	that	the	Chief	Executive	would	be	returned	by	direct	election	in	2017,	and	the	
Legislative	Council	could	be	returned	by	direct	election	thereafter,	which	means	2020	at	the	
earliest.		While	this	may	still	be	disappointing	to	many	pan-democrats	who	had	been	
campaigning	for	direct	election	since	the	1980s,	the	NPCSC	decision	at	least	set	down	clearly	the	
direction	and	the	time	frame	to	reach	the	destination.	
	
In	2009,	the	Government	published	a	further	consultation	document	on	the	selection	of	
the	Chief	Executive	and	the	Legislative	Council	in	2012.		It	revived	the	defeated	reform	package	
in	2005	with	two	amendments,	namely	that	the	appointed	District	Councillors	would	be	
excluded	from	the	electoral	college	as	previously	demanded	by	the	pan-democrats,	and	the	
reduction	in	size	of	the	Election	Committee	responsible	for	the	election	of	the	Chief	Executive.				
This	time	the	pan-democrats	split	among	themselves.		The	more	radical	faction	insisted	on	the	
abolition	of	functional	constituency	election	in	2012,	and	attempted	to	force	a	de	facto	
referendum	with	a	few	directly	elected	members	resigning	from	the	Legislative	Council	and	
successfully	getting	re-elected	in	a	by-election	on	a	single-issue	platform	of	direct	election	of	
both	the	Chief	Executive	and	the	Legislative	Council	in	2012	–	a	controversial	move	which	
antagonized	the	Central	Government.		The	moderate	faction	preferred	to	conciliate	with	a	hope	
to	entering	into	a	more	constructive	dialogue	with	the	Central	Government	on	the	details	of	
implementing	the	NPCSC’s	decision	in	2009.		With	the	support	of	the	moderate	faction,	the	
proposal	was	able	to	secure	the	necessary	majority	at	the	Legislative	Council.	
	
While	the	roadmap	to	full	democracy	has	been	drawn,	there	are	still	a	number	of	
unsettled	issues.		As	far	as	the	Chief	Executive	is	concerned,	the	NPCSC	has	decided	that	the	
Chief	Executive	will	be	returned	by	universal	suffrage	in	2017.		The	challenge	for	the	Central	
																																								 																				
60	For	the	second	term	onward,	the	Election	Committee	comprises	800	members,	a	quarter	of	which	
comes	from	each	of	the	four	sectors	of	(1)	Industrial,	commercial	and	financial	sectors;	(b)	professions;	(c)	
Labour,	social	services,	religious	and	other	sectors;	and	(d)	members	of	the	Legislative	Council,	
representatives	of	district-based	organizations,	Hong	Kong	deputies	to	the	NPC,	and	representatives	of	
Hong	Kong	members	of	the	National	Committee	of	the	Chinese	People’s	Political	Consultative	Conference.	
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Government	is	how	far	it	is	prepared	to	tolerate	a	genuine	election,	where	the	outcome	of	will	
be	unpredictable.		The	only	way	to	ensure	a	predictable	result	is	to	impose	restrictions	on	the	
nomination	process	so	that	only	candidates	acceptable	to	Beijing	could	pass	through	the	
nomination	process.		The	details	of	the	nomination	process	are	still	to	be	worked	out.		As	far	as	
the	Legislative	Council	is	concerned,	the	Central	Government	has	not	committed	itself	to	a	
definite	date	for	direct	election,	save	that	this	could	not	happen	before	the	direct	election	of	the	
Chief	Executive	in	2017.		At	present	half	of	the	Legislative	Council	is	returned	by	functional	
constituency	election.		Debates	are	still	ongoing	as	to	whether	functional	constituency	election	
is	consistent	with	election	by	universal	suffrage,	and	whether	there	are	ways	to	preserve	
functional	constituency	election	such	as	having	a	system	of	two	votes	for	every	eligible	elector.		
Apart	from	the	vested	interests	of	the	functional	constituencies	to	prolong	their	influence	in	the	
political	process,	any	reform	is	plagued	by	the	deep-seated	mutual	suspicion	between	the	
Central	Government	and	the	pan-democrats,	even	when	the	moderate	faction	of	the	pan-
democrats	have	taken	the	initiative	to	attempt	to	mend	the	relationship.		
	
V. Reflections	on	the	Future	
Hong	Kong	was	promised	a	high	degree	of	autonomy.		This	chapter	attempts	to	analyse	
this	promise	in	light	of	central-local	relationship,	internal	autonomy	on	protection	of	
fundamental	rights	and	freedoms,	and	development	of	representative	government.		On	the	
whole,	in	the	last	15	years,	this	promise	has	by	and	large	been	fulfilled.		There	is	little	
interference	from	the	Central	Government	in	relation	to	internal	affairs	of	Hong	Kong,	save	in	
the	area	of	democratic	development.		Fundamental	rights	and	freedoms	are	upheld.		
Independence	of	the	judiciary	has	been	maintained,	and	the	courts	have	lived	up	to	the	
expectation	of	being	liberal	and	vigilant	in	safeguarding	fundamental	rights	and	liberties.		There	
are	inherent	problems	with	the	model	of	‘one	country,	two	systems’,	notably	in	the	demarcation	
of	jurisdiction	between	the	Central	Government	and	the	HKSAR.		Thus,	it	is	not	surprising	that	in	
the	early	days,	the	court	tried	to	push	the	extent	of	its	jurisdiction,	albeit	with	limited	success.		
The	precise	boundary	is	still	fluid,	and	could	only	be	worked	out	with	the	passage	of	time.		There	
are	also	systemic	conflicts,	arising	from	the	co-existence	and	interaction	of	two	different	legal	
systems	and	legal	cultures.			In	the	recent	Congo	case,	the	Court	of	Final	Appeal	tried	to	lay	
down	constitutional	conventions	to	streamline	the	process	of	judicial	referral	to	the	NPCSC	for	
interpretation	of	the	Basic	Law.		This	laudable	attempt	to	reduce	the	arbitrariness	of	the	process	
may	shed	light	on	a	new	direction	of	development	in	this	asymmetrical	model	of	autonomy.			
The	picture	is	less	promising	in	the	area	of	democratic	development.		The	pace	of	
democratic	development	was	tightly	controlled	by	the	Central	Government.		With	a	well-
established	legal	system,	a	high	level	of	education,	a	high	level	of	civic	consciousness,	a	large	
and	stable	middle	class,	an	affluent	economy,	a	highly	efficient	society,	a	clean	civil	service	and	a	
relatively	stable	political	environment,	Hong	Kong	has	all	the	necessary	attributes	to	allow	
universal	suffrage.		Yet	until	now,	half	of	the	members	of	the	Legislative	Council	are	not	elected	
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by	universal	suffrage,	and	the	Chief	Executive	is	still	elected	by	a	small	privileged	group.		A	major	
breakthrough	was	made	in	December	2007	when	the	NPCSC	decided	that	the	Chief	Executive	
would	be	elected	by	universal	suffrage	in	2017	and	the	same	for	the	Legislative	Council	
thereafter.		Yet	many	people	are	skeptical	if	there	would	be	genuine	election	by	universal	
suffrage,	and	such	concern	is	supported	by	at	least	three	reasons.		First,	a	lot	of	details	are	still	
to	be	worked	out,	such	as	the	nomination	process	for	the	Chief	Executive	and	the	future	role	of	
functional	constituencies,	if	any,	in	the	Legislative	Council.		Apart	from	tightly	controlling	the	
pace	of	democratization	in	Hong	Kong,	the	Liaison	Office	of	the	Central	Government	in	Hong	
Kong	has	played	an	active	role	in	coordinating	the	pro-establishment/pro-China	candidates	in	
various	elections	of	the	District	Council	and	Legislative	Council	in	the	past.		In	the	election	of	the	
Chief	Executive	in	2012,	the	Liaison	Office	of	the	Central	Government	even	adopted	a	high	
profile	in	lobbying	members	of	the	Election	Committee	at	the	final	stage	of	the	election.61		There	
is	no	reason	to	believe	that	the	Central	Government	will	be	indifferent	to	the	outcome	of	the	
election	whatever	the	system	of	election	is,	or	will	refrain	from	exerting	influences	if	not	
interference	until	its	wishes	are	honoured.		Secondly,	Hong	Kong	has	suffered	from	an	awkward	
political	system	in	that	those	in	power	do	not	have	popular	mandate	and	those	having	popular	
mandate	have	no	chance	to	be	in	power.		This	has	resulted	in	a	rather	strenuous	relationship	
between	the	Legislature	and	the	Executive	Government	in	the	past;	and	loose	political	coalitions	
has	not	proved	to	work.		One	of	the	solutions	is	to	develop	party	politics,	which	is	in	any	event	
necessary	for	universal	suffrage.		Yet,	there	is	a	strong	degree	of	mutual	distrust	between	the	
democratic	camp	in	Hong	Kong	and	the	Central	Government,	which	will	in	turn	provide	a	strong	
incentive	for	the	Central	Government	to	interfere	with	any	election	to	prevent	the	democratic	
camp	from	gaining	control	of	the	Legislature	or	the	Executive	Government.	
This	leads	to	a	more	fundamental	issue	on	the	different	understanding	of	autonomy	
between	the	Central	Government	and	the	people	of	the	HKSAR.		As	perceptively	pointed	out	by	
Professor	Albert	Chen,	the	pro-democrats	understand	autonomy	as	a	Western	liberal	concept	
under	which	the	people	of	Hong	Kong	should	be	allowed	to	freely	elect	their	own	Legislature	
and	Chief	Executive,	and	that	the	Central	Government	should	leave	Hong	Kong	alone	as	long	as	
it	stays	within	the	Basic	Law.62		In	contrast,	Beijing’s	understanding	of	autonomy	is	that	
democratization	in	Hong	Kong	is	acceptable	only	if	it	will	result	in	‘patriots	ruling	Hong	Kong’.		
The	concession	by	the	Central	Government	is	that	Hong	Kong	will	be	ruled	by	Hong	Kong	people,	
not	by	cadres	sent	from	Beijing,	but	these	‘Hong	Kong	people’	have	to	be	those	who	enjoy	the	
trust	and	confidence	of	the	Central	Government,	and	not	merely	the	trust	and	confidence	of	the	
people	of	Hong	Kong.			Therefore,	full	democracy	will	only	be	allowed	if	such	full	democracy	will	
produce	a	legislature	and	a	government	dominated	by	‘patriots’.		Before	the	social	and	political	
conditions	in	Hong	Kong	reach	that	point,	democracy	in	Hong	Kong	will	only	be	a	contrived	form	
																																								 																				
61	The	Election	Committee	comprises	1,200	members.	
62	Albert	Chen,	‘Development	of	Representative	Government’,	in	Johannes	Chan	&	C	L	Lim	(eds),	Law	of	
the	Hong	Kong	Constitution	(Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2011),	Ch	8,	at	paras	8.081-8.086.	
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of	democracy,	or	‘semi-democracy’	as	Professor	Chen	describes	it,	where	free	election	is	
permitted	only	among	candidates	who	are	acceptable	to	the	Central	Government.	
Another	ideological	concern	of	the	Central	Government	is	that	freedom	and	liberty	in	
Hong	Kong	are	tolerated	only	to	the	extent	that	Hong	Kong	will	not	become	a	counter-
revolutionary	basis	that	may	threaten	the	legitimacy	or	authority	of	the	Central	Government.			
Hong	Kong	is	only	a	city	in	China,	albeit	an	important	global	financial	centre.		It	has	an	important	
role	to	play	in	the	economic	reform	in	China.		The	Central	Government	is	pleased	to	see	
economic	growth	in	Hong	Kong.		Democratic	development	is	seen	as	a	necessary	means	to	
maintain	stability	and	prosperity	of	Hong	Kong,	that	is,	democracy	is	perceived	as	a	means	to	
maintain	economic	success	and	should	never	threaten	the	thriving	economy	of	Hong	Kong	
which	is	seen	to	be	supported	by	the	successful	business	sector.		Therefore,	the	design	of	the	
political	system	is	heavily	tilted	in	favour	of	the	business	sector,	whereas	democracy	is	
associated	with	a	welfare	state	that	will	pull	back	economic	development.		In	the	final	analysis,	
to	the	Central	Government,	‘one	country,	two	systems’	means	nothing	more	than	‘one	country,	
two	economic	systems’.	
At	the	same	time,	the	role	of	Hong	Kong	in	the	development	of	China	has	changed	over	
time.		It	was	intended	to	be	a	showcase	for	Taiwan,	but	the	significance	of	Hong	Kong	in	this	
respect	has	diminished	over	time,	especially	after	Kuomingtang,	which	has	adopted	a	more	
conciliatory	approach	towards	the	Mainland,	has	regained	power	in	Taiwan.		In	contrast,	Hong	
Kong	becomes	increasingly	important	in	the	overall	strategic	development	in	China.		In	the	early	
days	after	the	handover,	Hong	Kong	was	left	out	of	the	national	strategic	development	plan.				In	
2010,	Hong	Kong	was	for	the	first	time	included	in	the	national	strategic	development	plan	and	
was	designated	to	play	a	prominent	role	as	a	leading	international	financial	centre	and	to	lead	
the	development	in	this	regard	in	the	Pearl	River	Delta	Region.		This	news	is	good	for	Hong	Kong	
as	it	is	becoming	important	to	China	on	its	own	right,	providing	that	it	is	able	to	continue	to	play	
a	leading	economic	and	financial	role	and	to	maintain	its	competitive	edges	in	the	rapid	
economic	development	in	China.		At	the	same	time,	as	the	economic	power	and	global	
influences	of	China	continue	to	grow,	the	success	of	Hong	Kong	is	increasingly	attributed	by	
some	quarters	close	to	the	Central	Government	to	the	benevolence	of	the	Central	Government	
and	no	longer	to	the	legal	system	and	the	core	values	of	Hong	Kong.		It	has	been	said	that	Hong	
Kong	can	only	maintain	its	status	as	an	international	financial	centre	so	long	as	the	Central	
Government	wishes	it	to	be.		Such	attitude	appears	to	be	gaining	ground	as	China	becomes	
more	confident	of	herself	after	the	global	financial	crisis	in	the	early	2010s	when	China	played	a	
pivotal	role	in	curbing	a	global	currency	crisis.		Such	emerging	phenomenon,	which	may	be	
described	as	a	success	without	an	anchor	in	core	values,	is	a	problem	that	China	has	to	face	in	
her	economic	and	social	development	and	may,	if	it	is	allowed	to	grow	unchecked,	ultimately	
destroy	the	very	concept	of	‘one	country,	two	systems’	itself.						
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3443071 
